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Abstract
Linear models are typically used in the regression analysis of capital structure
choices. However, given the proportional and bounded nature of leverage ratios,
models such as the tobit, the fractional regression model and its two-part variant
are a better alternative. In this paper, we discuss the main econometric assumptions
and features of those models, provide a theoretical foundation for their use in the
regression analysis of leverage ratios and review some statistical tests suitable to
assess their speciﬁcation. Using a dataset previously considered in the literature,
we carry out a comprehensive comparison of the alternative models, ﬁnding that
in this framework the most relevant functional form issue is the choice between a
single model for all capital structure decisions and a two-part model that explains
separately the decisions to issue debt and, conditional on the ﬁrst decision, on the
amount of debt to issue.
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11 Introduction
The regression analysis of the ﬁnancing decisions of ﬁrms has been a key theme in ap-
plied corporate ﬁnance for more than thirty years. Typically, empirical studies on capital
structure decisions use linear models to examine how a given set of potential explanatory
variables (X) inﬂuences some leverage ratio (Y ). However, leverage ratios (e.g. debt to
capital or total assets) possess two basic characteristics that may render the linear model
inadequate for explaining them: (i) by deﬁnition, they are bounded on the closed interval
[0,1];1 and (ii) many ﬁrms have null leverage ratios.2 Therefore, regression models that
take into account (at least one of) those characteristics of leverage ratios are potentially a
better alternative for modelling the conditional mean of leverage ratios, E (Y |X), which
is usually the main interest in applied work. Because many ﬁrms have no debt, a popu-
lar alternative to linear modelling has been the use of the tobit model for data censored
at zero (e.g. Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Wald, 1999; Cassar, 2004). Other alternatives
include the fractional regression model proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996), which
was speciﬁcally developed for dealing with fractional or proportional response variables
such as leverage ratios, and its two-part variant (Ramalho and Silva, 2009), which treats
separately the decisions on using debt or not (using a binary choice model) and, con-
ditional on this decision, the decision on the relative amount of debt to issue (using a
fractional regression model).
Tobit, fractional and two-part fractional regression models are based on very distinct
assumptions about the data generating process of leverage ratios, i.e., how ﬁrms make
their capital structure decisions. For example, the tobit model assumes that the accu-
1Actually, this is strictly valid only for market leverage ratios. Indeed, because some ﬁrms may have
negative book values of equity, book leverage ratios may display values higher than one. However, given
that ﬁrms with negative book values of equity are typically excluded from empirical studies on capital
structure (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Byoun, 2008; Lemmon, Roberts and Zender, 2008) or their
leverage ratios are re-coded to one (e.g. Faulkender and Petersen, 2006), book leverage ratios are also,
in practical terms, eﬀectively restricted to the unit interval in most cases.
2For example, Strebulaev and Yang (2007), Byoun, Moore and Xu (2008), Bessler, Drobetz, Haller and
Meier (2011) and Dang (2011) report that an average of 8.9% of U.S. ﬁrms (sample period: 1962-2003),
12.2% of U.S. ﬁrms (1971-2006), 11.0% of G7 ﬁrms (1988-2008) and 12.2% of U.K. ﬁrms (1980-2007),
respectively, had zero outstanding debt. In the last year of the sample period, those ﬁgures rise to
18.2%, 22.6%, 14.2% and 23.7%, respectively, which shows that the zero-leverage phenomenon has been
increasing over time.
2mulation of observations at zero is the result of a censoring problem (e.g. the ﬁrms with
zero debt would really like to have negative debt) and should be modelled as such, the
fractional model ignores the causes of that accumulation and treats the zero observations
as any other value (as the linear model also does), and the two-part fractional model
assumes that the zero and the positive leverage ratios are generated from diﬀerent, in-
dependent mechanisms. Thus, while in the fractional (and also in the linear) regression
model it is only relevant to calculate E (Y |X), in the other cases choosing a functional
form for E (Y |X) automatically deﬁnes expressions for the probability of a ﬁrm using
debt, Pr(Y > 0|X), and the conditional mean of leverage ratios for ﬁrms that do use
debt, E (Y |X,Y > 0), which may be also of interest for researchers. Moreover, while in
the tobit model each explanatory variable is restricted to inﬂuence in the same direction
E (Y |X), Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0), the two-part fractional model allows the co-
variates to aﬀect in independent ways each one of those quantities. Finally, while the
tobit model requires distributional assumptions, the two-part fractional model typically
only requires such assumptions for its binary component, and the fractional model does
not require them at all.
Because they are based on very diﬀerent assumptions, we may suspect that the results
produced by each model may be also very distinct. If that is the case, then using an
incorrect functional form for E (Y |X) may generate misleading conclusions about how
ﬁnancial leverage decisions are made. To choose the most appropriate speciﬁcation in
empirical work, practitioners may resort to theoretical arguments (e.g. if the zeros are
interpreted as the result from a unique ﬁrm value-maximizing decision, then using a two-
part fractional regression model makes no sense because this model assumes that the
zeros result from two independent decisions) and/or use econometric speciﬁcation tests.
Nevertheless, most empirical studies on capital structure decisions assume a priori a given
speciﬁcation for E (Y |X) and do not test the assumptions underlying the model chosen
or justify theoretically their option.
The main aim of this paper is the analysis of the main functional forms issues that
may arise when studying the determinants of capital structure choices. In particular, we
discuss the econometric speciﬁcation, estimation and evaluation of linear, tobit, fractional
and two-part fractional regression models and provide a theoretical foundation for their
use in this context. As little is known about the consequences of using an incorrect
3model in the analysis of capital structure decisions, we use a data set of Portuguese ﬁrms
previously considered in the literature (Ramalho and Silva, 2009) to compare the results
yielded by each model at various levels: (i) the signiﬁcance, direction and magnitude of
the marginal eﬀects of covariates; and (ii) the prediction of leverage ratios.
The most closely related paper to ours is Ramalho and Silva (2009). In fact, in addition
to using the same data set, they have considered the same regression models. However,
since Ramalho and Silva (2009) were mainly interested in justifying the use of a two-part
fractional regression model to study the ﬁnancial leverage decisions of Portuguese ﬁrms,
the other speciﬁcations were only brieﬂy addressed and the focus of the empirical analysis
was the assessment of several hypotheses about capital structure choices. In contrast, in
this paper we deal with all models in a comprehensive and balanced way, establish clear
links between all of them and capital structure theories, propose statistical tests suitable to
assess the model assumptions and focus the empirical illustration on comparisons across
models. The ultimate aim of this paper is to provide a sound econometric basis for
analyzing leverage ratios bounded in the unit interval.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the four alternative regression
models that we consider in this paper for analyzing ﬁnancial leverage decisions. Section 3
shows why some capital structure theories imply the use of particular regression models
and propose some econometric tests for assessing the speciﬁcation of each model. Section
4 compares the alternative regression models using Ramalho and Silva’s (2009) dataset.
Finally, section 5 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Regression models for capital structure choices
In this section, we discuss the main characteristics of linear, tobit, fractional and two-part
fractional regression models, stressing their advantages and drawbacks when applied to
the regression analysis of fractional response variables, in general, and leverage ratios, in
particular.
2.1 Linear model
Most empirical studies of capital structure have used linear regression models to explain
observed leverage ratios; see inter alia Prasade, Green and Murinde (2005) and Frank
4and Goyal (2008), which summarize the main methodologies used in capital structure
empirical research. However, the linearity assumption
E (Y |X) = Xβ, (1)
where β denotes the vector of parameters of interest, is unlikely to hold in our framework.
Indeed, in linear models, the eﬀect on E (Y |X) of a unitary change in the explanatory




which is not compatible with both the bounded nature of leverage ratios and the existence
of a mass-point at zero in their distribution. Moreover, the conceptual requirement that
the predicted values of Y lie in the interval [0,1] is not satisﬁed by the linear model.
Note also that the use of the linear model in this framework requires the computation of
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, since the conditional variance of Y is in general
a function of its conditional mean: the former must change as the latter approaches either
boundary.
While it is straightforward to compute heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and,
to some extent, the problem of assuming constant marginal eﬀects may be overcome by
augmenting the model with nonlinear functions of X (which, however, do not correspond
to the standard practice in empirical capital structure studies), the predicted values from
a linear regression model can never be guaranteed to lie in the unit interval.3 Therefore,
any sensible description of the true data generating process of leverage ratios cannot be
based on the use of linear models. Nevertheless, in this paper, as the linear regression
model has been used in most previous empirical capital structure studies, we investigate
in which conditions, if any, may the linear model constitute a reasonable approximation
for that data generating process.
2.2 Tobit model
As a typical random sample of ﬁrms contains many ﬁrms that do not use debt, some au-
thors have opted for using a tobit approach for data censored at zero for modeling leverage
3Basically, the drawbacks of using linear speciﬁcations for modeling fractional data are similar to the
drawbacks of using the linear probability model for describing binary data.
5decisions. The tobit model was originally proposed for cases where the explanatory vari-
ables are fully observed for all sampling units but the variable of interest is incompletely
observed (only its positive values are observed, while its non-positive values are, just by
convenience, represented by zeros). Thus, instead of observing Y ∗, the latent variable
of interest, we observe Y , which is deﬁned as follows: Y = Y ∗ for Y ∗ > 0 and Y = 0
otherwise. It is also assumed that Y ∗ has a normal distribution, that there exists a linear
relationship between Y ∗ and the covariates, E (Y ∗|X) = Xβ, and that the error term of
the latent model, u = Y ∗ − E (Y ∗|X), is homoskedastic.
While in early applications of tobit models the main interest was inference on Y ∗,
currently the tobit model is also often used for explaining the inﬂuence of X on Y (see e.g.
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 517-521). In the regression analysis of leverage ratios, the main
goal of any empirical capital structure study is eﬀectively to explain observed leverage
ratios, not the latent ones. Thus, the speciﬁcation of the tobit model that is relevant for
our purposes, which is implied by the assumptions made above for Y ∗, is given by











where Φ( ) and φ( ) denote the standard normal distribution and density functions, re-
spectively, and σ is the standard deviation of u. The tobit model also implies that
















see Wooldridge (2002) for details. Given the distributional assumption made for Y ∗, the
parameters β and σ are estimated by the maximum likelihood method.









We may also compute the marginal eﬀects of a covariate Xj over the probability of using
debt and over the conditional mean leverage ratios of ﬁrms that do use debt, which are
given by, respectively,







































Given the non-linearity of speciﬁcations (3), (4) and (5), the corresponding marginal
eﬀects of the explanatory variables on leverage ratios are not constant, having to be
calculated for speciﬁc values of the explanatory variables. However, it is straightforward
to show that, in expressions (6), (7) and (8), βj is being multiplied by a positive term.
Therefore, to examine the signiﬁcance and direction of each marginal eﬀect, it suﬃces to
test the signiﬁcance and analyze the sign of βj. This implies that in the tobit model: (i)
if an explanatory variable is relevant to explain E (Y |X), it is also important to explain
Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0); and (ii) if an explanatory variable inﬂuences positively
(negatively) E (Y |X), its inﬂuence over Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0) is also positive
(negative).
Using the tobit model in our framework has the advantage of taking into account the
existence of a mass-point at zero in the distribution of leverage ratios but still ignores
their bounded nature: equation (3), despite being limited from below at zero, still has
no upper bound.4 Thus, like the linear model, the tobit model cannot represent the true
data generating process of leverage ratios. However, in contrast to the linear model, the
tobit model may constitute a very reasonable approximation to the true data generating
process in some cases. Indeed, in practical terms, the absence of an upper bond in the
tobit model may be irrelevant in many cases, in particular when the proportion of very
highly leveraged ﬁrms is insigniﬁcant. A more serious problem is that the tobit model
is very stringent in terms of assumptions, requiring normality and homoskedasticity of
the latent dependent variable. The assumption of each covariate to inﬂuence in the same
direction Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0) may also be too restrictive in some cases;
for an example, see the last paragraph of Section 3.1. There are some modiﬁed tobit
models that could be used (e.g. the heteroskedasticity-robust tobit estimator used by
Wald, 1999), but none of them would solve simultaneously all the issues associated with
the use of tobit models. Anyway, if we are not interested in the latent model, instead of
ﬁrst specifying it in order to ﬁnd a model for the actual outcomes, would not it be more
4Note that a two-limit version of the tobit model, with limits at 0 and 1 (e.g. Johnson 1997), which
would in fact restrict the predicted values of Y to the unit interval, cannot be applied, in general, to
model leverage ratios, since usually there are no observations for Y = 1.
7natural simply assuming directly a model for E (Y |X), as the models discussed next do?
2.3 Fractional regression models
Recently, Cook, Kieschnick and McCullough (2008) and Ramalho and Silva (2009) have
used the so-called fractional regression model (FRM) (or some extension of it) to analyze
the ﬁnancial leverage of ﬁrms; see Ramalho, Ramalho and Murteira (2011) for a recent
survey on this model. The FRM was developed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) for
dealing speciﬁcally with dependent variables deﬁned on the unit interval and, therefore,
is based on the assumption of a functional form for E (Y |X) that respects the range of
values that leverage ratios may take on:
E (Y |X) = G(Xβ), (9)
where G( ) is some nonlinear function satisfying 0 ≤ G( ) ≤ 1.
Papke and Wooldridge (1996) suggest as possible speciﬁcations forG( ) any cumulative
distribution function such as those that are commonly employed with binary responses.
Thus, popular choices for G( ) are the well-known probit and logit functional forms or the
asymmetric loglog and complementary loglog models, which are given by, respectively,
G(Xβ) = Φ(Xβ), G(Xβ) =
eXβ
1 + eXβ, G(Xβ) = e
−e−Xβ
and G(Xβ) = 1 − e
−eXβ
.
The partial eﬀects implied by each one of these alternative FRMs are given by
∂E (Y |X)
∂Xj
= βjg (Xβ), (10)
where g(Xβ) = ∂G(Xβ)/∂ (Xβ). Hence, for the same reasons indicated for the tobit
model, the signiﬁcance and the direction of the marginal eﬀects may be analyzed simply
by examining the signiﬁcance and sign of βj.
The most relevant assumption made in the FRM is the functional form adopted for
E (Y |X). Thus, this model requires fewer assumptions than the tobit model and similar
assumptions to the linear model. Another advantage relative to the tobit model is that
the predicted values of leverage ratios are guaranteed to lie in the unit interval in all
circumstances. On the other hand, the main drawback of the FRM, also relative to the
tobit model, is that it treats the zero observations as any other value, i.e. implicitly
it is assumed that the probability of observing a speciﬁc value in the interval [0,1] is
8insigniﬁcant. This implies that the FRM may not be the best option for modeling leverage
ratios when a large proportion of the sampled ﬁrms do not use debt. Also, for the same
reason, it is not possible to obtain sensible estimates of Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0),
which may be quantities of interest for researchers in many empirical studies, given the
large number of no-debt ﬁrms that are usually present in ﬁnancial leverage regression
analysis.
Typically, the FRM is estimated by the quasi-maximum likelihood method, using as
log-likelihood function the same Bernoulli function that is used with binary responses.
See Papke and Wooldridge (1996) or Ramalho, Ramalho and Murteira (2011) for details.
2.4 Two-part fractional regression models
In contrast to the FRM, the two-part FRM (2P-FRM) proposed by Ramalho and Silva
(2009) takes explicitly into account that the probability of observing a no-debt ﬁrm may
be relatively large. The 2P-FRM uses separate models to explain the decisions: (i) to
issue or not to issue debt; and (ii) (for those ﬁrms that do decide to use debt) on how
much debt to issue (in relative terms). With this model, the factors that explain the
former decision are not constrained to be the same that aﬀect the latter decision and
their eﬀect may be diﬀerent in magnitude.
The 2P-FRM may be expressed as
E (Y |X) = Pr(Y > 0|X)   E (Y |X,Y > 0)
= F (Xβ1P)   M (Xβ2P), (11)
where β1P and β2P are vectors of variable coeﬃcients and F ( ) and M ( ) are typically
cumulative distribution functions, i.e. they may be speciﬁed as the G( ) function consid-
ered in the previous section. Thus, in the ﬁrst part of the 2P-FRM model, a standard
binary choice model is used for explaining the probability of a ﬁrm using debt,
Pr(Y > 0|X) = Pr(Z = 1|X) = F (Xβ1P), (12)
where Z = 1 for Y > 0 and Z = 0 otherwise, while in the second part, a standard FRM
is used to explain the magnitude of the leverage ratios of ﬁrms that do use debt:
E (Y |X,Y > 0) = M (Xβ2P). (13)
9For simplicity, we assume that the same regressors appear in both parts of the model,
but this assumption can be relaxed and, in fact, should be if there are obvious exclusion
restrictions. Note that the two components of (11) are estimated separately: while model
(12) is estimated by maximum likelihood using the whole sample, model (13) is estimated
by quasi-maximum likelihood using only the sub-sample of ﬁrms with nonzero leverage
ratios.
The marginal eﬀects of a covariate Xj over the probability of observing a ﬁrm using
debt and the conditional mean leverage ratios of leveraged ﬁrms are given by, respectively,
∂ Pr(Y > 0|X)
∂Xj
= β1Pjf (Xβ1P) (14)
and
E (Y |X,Y > 0)
∂Xj
= β2Pjm(Xβ2P), (15)
where f (Xβ1P) and m(Xβ2P) are the partial derivatives of F ( ) and M ( ) with respect




= β1Pjf (Xβ1P)M (Xβ2P) + β2PjF (Xβ1P)m(Xβ2P). (16)
To analyze the signiﬁcance and direction of the marginal eﬀects (14) and (15), it
suﬃces to examine the signiﬁcance and sign of β1Pj and β2Pj, respectively. Therefore,
in contrast to the tobit model, as β1Pj and β2Pj are not constrained to be identical,
each covariate is allowed to inﬂuence in opposite ways Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0).
Regarding the overall marginal eﬀect (16), the simple analysis of β1Pj and β2Pj may not
lead, in general, to any conclusion. Indeed, unless both parameters are signiﬁcant and
have the same sign, determining the overall signiﬁcance and direction of a covariate in a
2P-FRM requires the full evaluation of (16). Given that (16) depends on the values of all
explanatory variables, the overall marginal eﬀect of a particular covariate may be positive
for some ﬁrms, negative for others and insigniﬁcant for the remaining.
Clearly, the 2P-FRM is much more ﬂexible than the tobit model. In fact, an expression
similar to (16) may be also written for the tobit model, see McDonald and Moﬃtt (1980),
but with β1P and β2P constrained to be identical and F ( ) and M ( ) required to be
based on normal distribution functions. Another model that is more ﬂexible than the
tobit model and closely related to the two-part model is the bivariate sample selection
10model (also known as type II tobit model), namely Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure.
While the two-part model assumes that the level of use, if any, is conditionally independent
of the decision to use (implying that each part of the model is modelled independently of
the other), Heckman’s (1979) approach is based on a joint model for both the censoring
mechanism and outcome, where the error terms of the participation and amount debt
decision equations are assumed to be related (implying that the equation estimated in
the second step has an additional regressor that was estimated in the ﬁrst step). To the
best of our knowledge, Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure has not been adapted to
the fractional response framework. See Leung and Yu (1996) for a generic comparison
between two-part and sample selection models.
3 Which regression model to use?
In this section, we ﬁrst discuss why some capital structure theories are best represented
by speciﬁc regression models. Then, we review some econometric tests that may be used
for assessing the speciﬁcation of each regression model and discriminating between the
competing models and, hence, theories.
3.1 Theoretical reasoning
From the analysis in Section 2, it is clear that the four regression models analyzed may
be divided in two main groups. On the one hand, we have the linear, the tobit and the
fractional regression models, termed from now on ‘one-part models’, which imply that
each covariate has a unique type of eﬀect on leverage ratios. On the other hand, we
have the 2P-FRM, which allows the zero and the positive leverage ratios to be explained
diﬀerently. Therefore, when choosing a suitable regression model for describing a speciﬁc
capital structure theory, a ﬁrst issue to consider is whether the theory provides or not a
single explanation for the zero and the positive leverage ratios, i.e. for the participation
and amount debt decisions. Then, when it seems preferable to use one-part models, a
further issue arises, again related to the interpretation placed upon the observed zeros: is
it possible to interpret them as caused by a censoring mechanism? In case of a positive
answer, then the tobit model is potentially the most suitable representation of the the-
ory. Otherwise, the FRM should be used (and the linear model could perhaps provide a
11reasonable approximation for the true data generating process).
Up to date, most capital structure empirical studies have used one-part models to
explain leverage ratios, which follows directly from the fact that most capital structure
theories provide a single explanation for all possible values of leverage ratios, including
the value zero. This is the case, for example, of the two most popular explanations of
capital structure decisions, the trade-oﬀ and the pecking-order theories. For details on
both theories, see the recent survey by Frank and Goyal (2008).
The trade-oﬀ theory claims the existence of an optimal capital structure that ﬁrms
have to reach in order to maximize their value. The focus of this theory is on the beneﬁts
and costs of debt. The former include essentially the tax deductibility of interest paid,
while the latter are originated by an excessive amount of debt and the consequent potential
bankruptcy costs. Thus, ﬁrms set a target level for their debt-equity ratio that balances
the tax advantages of additional debt against the costs of possible ﬁnancial distress and
bankruptcy. This optimization problem may generate for leverage ratios any value in the
unit interval, including the value zero.
The pecking-order theory, on the other hand, argues that ﬁrms do not possess an op-
timal capital structure, although the ﬁnancing decisions of each ﬁrm are not irrelevant for
its value. Indeed, due to information asymmetries between ﬁrms’ managers and potential
outside ﬁnanciers, which limit access to outside ﬁnance, ﬁrms tend to adopt a perfect
hierarchical order of ﬁnancing: ﬁrst, they use internal funds (retained earnings); in case
external ﬁnancing is needed, they issue low-risk debt; only as a last resort, when the ﬁrm
exhausts its ability to issue safe debt, are new shares issued. In the absence of investment
opportunities, ﬁrms retain earnings and build up ﬁnancial slack to avoid having to raise
external ﬁnance in the future. Hence, the ﬁrm leverage at each moment merely reﬂects
its external ﬁnancing requirements, which may be null or any positive amount, without a
tendency to revert to any particular capital structure.
As stated, the trade-oﬀ and the pecking-order theories seem to imply the use of the
FRM, since null leverage ratios result from an optimization problem, being, therefore,
a consequence of individual choices and not of any type of censoring. However, it is
straightforward to incorporate in those theories plausible justiﬁcations for the use of the
tobit model. For example, we may assume that the ﬁrms with zero debt would really
like to have negative debt (e.g. own short term debt securities or loans) but accounting
12conventions do not allow the entry of negative debt. Therefore, both FRM and tobit
models may be used in empirical work based on the trade-oﬀ and the pecking-order
theories.
In contrast to these classical capital structure theories, Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007),
Strebulaev and Yang (2007) and Ramalho and Silva (2009) have recently argued that zero-
leverage behaviour is a persistent phenomenon and that standard capital structure theories
are unable to provide a reasonable explanation for it. In particular, they found that while
larger ﬁrms are more likely to have some debt, conditional on having debt, larger ﬁrms
are less levered, that is, ﬁrm size seems to aﬀect in an inverse way the participation
and amount debt decisions. According to Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007), these opposite
eﬀects of ﬁrm size on leverage may be explained by the presence of ﬁxed costs of external
ﬁnancing, and the consequent infrequent reﬁnancing of ﬁrms, since smaller ﬁrms are much
more aﬀected in relative terms then larger ﬁrms. Thus: (i) small ﬁrms choose higher
leverage at the moment of reﬁnancing to compensate for less frequent rebalancing, which
explains why, conditional on having debt, they are more levered than large ﬁrms; (ii) as
they wait longer times between reﬁnancings, small ﬁrms, on average, have lower levels
of leverage; and (iii) in each moment, there is a mass of ﬁrms opting for no leverage,
since small ﬁrms may ﬁnd it optimal to postpone their debt issuances until their fortunes
improve substantially relative to the costs of issuance. Clearly, in this framework, the
2P-FRM is the best option for modelling leverage ratios, since the variable size and other
variables are allowed to inﬂuence each decision in a diﬀerent fashion.
3.2 Speciﬁcation tests
From the previous discussion, it is clear that when analyzing ﬁnancial leverage deci-
sions, we cannot establish a priori, using only theoretical arguments, whether one- or
two-part models should be used, since some of the competing theories imply the use of
one-part models and others favour the use of two-part models. Moreover, although the
ﬁnancial theory suggests the type of regression model that should be used, it does not
provide, in general, any indication about the speciﬁc model functional form that oﬀers the
best representation for the relationship between leverage ratios and explanatory variables.
Therefore, in order to increase the reliability of empirical results on capital structure de-
cisions, it is essential to apply statistical tests to discriminate between one- and two-part
13models and between alternative speciﬁcations for each class of models. However, despite
the availability of a number of tests that can be used to that end, such tests have been
rarely applied in empirical work. In this section, we discuss some of those econometric
tests. In particular, given that the main practical diﬀerence between alternative one-part
and two-part regression models relates to the functional form assumed for E (Y |X), see
(1), (3), (9) and (11), next we focus on tests for conditional mean assumptions.
One way of assessing the speciﬁcation of E (Y |X) is to use tests appropriate for de-
tecting general functional form misspeciﬁcations, such as the well-known RESET test.
Indeed, using standard approximation results for polynomials, it can be shown that any








for J large enough. Therefore, testing the
hypothesis E (Y |X) = S (Xθ) is equivalent to testing γ = 0 in the augmented model








. The ﬁrst few terms
in the expansion are the most important, and, in practice, only the quadratic and cu-
bic terms are usually considered. Note that the RESET test cannot be directly applied
to assess (11), the functional form assumed for two-part models. Instead, it has to be
separately applied to their two components, given by (12) and (13).
Alternatively, because all competing speciﬁcations for E (Y |X) are non-nested, we
may apply standard tests for non-nested hypotheses, where the alternative speciﬁcations
for E (Y |X) are tested against each other. An example of this type of test is the P test
proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), which is probably the simplest way of
comparing nonlinear regression models. To our knowledge, only Ramalho, Ramalho and
Henriques (2010) have applied the P test for choosing between linear, tobit and one-part
and two-part FRMs.
Suppose that H (Xα) and T (Xη) are competing functional forms for E (Y |X). As
shown by Davidson and MacKinnon (1981), testing H0 : H (Xα) against H1 : T (Xη) is
equivalent to testing the null hypothesis H0 : δ2 = 0 in the following auxiliary regression:
￿
y − ˆ H
￿
= ˆ hXδ1 + δ2
￿
ˆ T − ˆ H
￿
+ error, (17)
where h = ∂H (Xα)/∂ (Xα), δ2 is a scalar parameter and ˆ   denotes evaluation at the
estimators ˆ α or ˆ η, obtained by separately estimating the models deﬁned by H ( ) and
T ( ), respectively. To test H0 : T (Xη) against H1 : H (Xθ), we need to use another
P statistic, which is calculated using a similar auxiliary regression to (17) but with the
14roles of the two models interchanged. As is standard with tests of non-nested hypotheses,
three outcomes are possible: one may reject one model and accept the other, accept both
models or reject both.
In contrast to the RESET test, the P test may be applied to test directly the full
speciﬁcation of two-part models, i.e. H ( ) (and T ( )) may be given by (11). Thus, the
P test based on (17) may be used for choosing between: (i) alternative speciﬁcations for
one-part models; (ii) alternative speciﬁcations for two-part models; and (iii) one-part and
two-part models. In addition, H (xα) and T (xη) may represent alternative functional
forms for Pr(Y > 0|x) or E (Y |X,Y > 0), in which case the P test may be used to select
between competing speciﬁcations for the ﬁrst or the second component of a two-part
model, respectively.
As fractional data is intrinsically heteroskedastic, heteroskedasticity-robust versions
of the RESET and P tests must be computed in all cases.
4 Empirical comparison of alternative regression mod-
els for leverage ratios
In order to explore some of the functional form issues that aﬀect empirical capital structure
studies, in this section we compare the results produced by several alternative regression
models for leverage ratios using the data set considered previously by Ramalho and Silva
(2009). These authors analyzed the ﬁnancial leverage decisions of Portuguese ﬁrms using
a 2P-FRM model based on a logistic speciﬁcation for the two levels of the model. Here, we
consider also the tobit model and loglog speciﬁcations for the one- and (both components
of) two-part FRMs. We could have also considered other speciﬁcations for the FRM but,
as shown by Ramalho, Ramalho and Murteira (2011), in general, the most distinct results
are obtained when we contrast symmetric speciﬁcations (e.g. logit, probit) with asym-
metric ones (e.g. loglog, complementary loglog). Given that the number of Portuguese
ﬁrms that do not use (long-term) debt is very large (see Table 1 below), using a loglog
speciﬁcation is clearly the best option for an asymmetric FRM. We consider also a linear
speciﬁcation for the fractional component of 2P-FRMs in order to examine whether the
linear model is a better approximation for the true data generating process of leverage
ratios when the analysis is conditional on using debt.
15Next, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the data used in the analysis. Then,
we illustrate the usefulness of the speciﬁcation tests discussed in section 3 for selecting
appropriate regression models for leverage ratios. Finally, we compare the results of each
estimated model in the following respects: (i) the signiﬁcance, direction and magnitude
of marginal eﬀects; and (ii) the prediction of leverage ratios.
4.1 Data and variables
The sample used by Ramalho and Silva (2009) were drawn from the Banco de Portugal
Central Balance Sheet Data Oﬃce, which contains some information about balance sheets,
income statements and other characteristics of many Portuguese ﬁrms for the year 1999.
We excluded from the analysis the following types of ﬁrms: (i) non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, since
the capital structure of ﬁnancial corporations is not strictly comparable with those of
other ﬁrms - see Rajan and Zingales (1995); (ii) 15 ﬁrms with zero sales, in order to
exclude ﬁrms which were temporarily unoperational or in the very early or very late stages
of business operations; (iii) 283 ﬁrms with negative earnings before interest, taxes and
depreciation (EBITDA), because our regression model uses the ratio between depreciation
and EBITDA as a proxy for the explanatory variable non-debt tax shields (NDTS) -
the inclusion of ﬁrms with negative earnings would create a discontinuity in the NDTS
measure at zero euros of EBITDA (see e.g. Jensen, Solberg and Zorn 1992, p. 253,
footnote 9); (iv) 334 ﬁrms with negative book values of equity, because such ﬁrms lack
economic interpretation (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Byoun, 2008; Lemmon, Roberts
and Zender, 2008); and (v) 4 ﬁrms with huge outliers for the variable NTDS. This selection
criteria produced a ﬁnal sample of 4692 ﬁrms.
In accordance with the latest deﬁnitions adopted by the European Commission (recom-
mendation 2003/361/EC), each ﬁrm was assigned to one of the following four size-based
group of ﬁrms: micro ﬁrms, small ﬁrms, medium ﬁrms and large ﬁrms. Taking into ac-
count the conclusions achieved in Ramalho and Silva (2009), in this paper we perform
a separate regression analysis for each one of the following size-based group of ﬁrms: (i)
micro ﬁrms; (ii) small ﬁrms; and (iii) medium/large ﬁrms. In order to save space, only
the results obtained for the ﬁrst and third groups are reported below.5
5The results for small ﬁrms are relatively similar to those obtained for micro ﬁrms. Full results are
available from the author upon request.
16We consider as a measure of ﬁnancial leverage the ratio of long-term debt (LTD,
deﬁned as the total company’s debt due for repayment beyond one year) to long-term
capital assets (deﬁned as the sum of LTD and the book value of equity). As reported in
Table 1, which contains the breakdown of our sample by group, a very high proportion of
ﬁrms do not use LTD to ﬁnance their businesses: almost 90% of micro ﬁrms and about
half of medium and large ﬁrms. On the other hand, very few ﬁrms display leverage ratios
close to one. Clearly, in this framework, a very relevant issue is in fact how to deal with
the lower bound of leverage ratios. The much larger proportion of zero leverage ratios in
our sample than in those referred to in Footnote 2 may be explained as follows: (i) the
papers cited in Footnote 2 deﬁne a zero-leverage ﬁrm as a ﬁrm which has no outstanding
short-term and long-term debt in a given year, while we focus only on LTD; and (ii) the
databases (Compustat or Worldscope) used by those authors cover essentially large (and
publicly traded) ﬁrms, which are well known to use debt more frequently.
Table 1 about here
In all alternative regression models estimated next, we used the same explanatory
variables as those employed by Ramalho and Silva (2009): non-debt tax shields (NDTS),
measured by the ratio between depreciation and EBITDA; tangibility (TANGIB), the pro-
portion of tangible assets and inventories in total assets; size (SIZE), the natural logarithm
of sales; proﬁtability (PROFITAB), the ratio between earnings before interest and taxes
and total assets; growth (GROWTH), the yearly percentage change in total assets; age
(AGE), the number of years since the foundation of the ﬁrm; liquidity (LIQUIDITY), the
sum of cash and marketable securities, divided by current assets; and four industry dum-
mies: MANUFACTURING, CONSTRUCTION, Wholesale and Retail Trade (TRADE)
and Transport and Communication (COMMUNICATION). Table 2 reports some descrip-
tive statistics of the continuous explanatory variables for the two size-based groups of ﬁrms
considered in this analysis.
Table 2 about here
4.2 Model selection
We start our empirical analysis by applying to each alternative formalization the RESET
and the P tests. In the latter case, we considered, one by one, all estimated models as
17the alternative hypothesis. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results obtained for one- and
two-part models, respectively.
Table 3 about here
Table 4 about here
The results reported in Table 3 clearly indicate that using the linear model to describe
the ﬁnancial leverage decisions of Portuguese ﬁrms is not appropriate at all. In fact,
both for micro and medium/large ﬁrms, the speciﬁcation of the linear model is rejected
in all cases, irrespective of the test applied and of the alternative hypothesis used in the
implementation of the P test. For micro ﬁrms, the other one-part models do not seem also
to be suitable representations of capital structure decisions, since all of them are often
rejected when the alternative hypothesis considered in the application of the P test is a
two-part model. In contrast, for medium/large ﬁrms, the correct speciﬁcation of tobit,
FRM-logit and FRM-loglog is never rejected.
With regard to the speciﬁcation of two-part models, see Table 4, we performed two
types of tests. First, we applied separately the RESET and the P tests to each level of 2P-
FRMs. Then, we used the P test to assess the full speciﬁcation of 2P-FRMs against many
alternative models. While the former set of tests did not provide any evidence against the
correct speciﬁcation of any of the 2P-FRMs estimated, the latter conﬁrmed that these
models are particularly adequate for micro ﬁrms. Indeed, for this group of ﬁrms, the
correct speciﬁcation of four (two) 2P-FRM is never rejected at the 5% (10%) level. In
contrast, in the case of medium/large ﬁrms, all two-part models are rejected at least once
at the 10% and only two are never rejected at the 5% level. Note also that using a linear
model in the second component of 2P-FRMs does not seem to produce any additional
problems relative to other alternatives, i.e. once no-debt ﬁrms are dropped, linear models
seem to provide a much better approximation for the data generating process of leverage
ratios.
Combining the results reported in Tables 3 and 4, we ﬁnd that two-part models are
clearly preferable for micro ﬁrms, while there is some evidence that one-part models are
better for medium/large ﬁrms. These conclusions are not surprising and we conjecture
that they are directly related to the proportion of zero-debt ﬁrms in each group. In fact, in
the micro ﬁrm group, zero leverage ratios occur with too large a frequency than seems to
be consistent with a simple, one-part model. Indeed, given their reduced size, the theory
18put forward by Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007), see Section 3.1, applies particularly to
them.6
4.3 Marginal eﬀects: statistical signiﬁcance, direction and mag-
nitude
The results obtained in the previous section show clearly that the same regression model is
not suitable, in general, to explain the capital structure decisions of all size-based groups
of ﬁrms. However, in most empirical studies, only one type of regression model is esti-
mated and no speciﬁcation tests are applied. In this Section, we investigate whether the
conclusions, in terms of the signiﬁcance, direction and magnitude, produced by alternative
models, some of which are naturally misspeciﬁed, are substantially diﬀerent or not.
In Tables 5 and 6, we report for both one- and two-part models, respectively, the
estimation results obtained for micro and medium/large ﬁrms. For each explanatory
variable, we report the values of the associated estimated coeﬃcient and t-statistic. For
each model, we report also the value of an R2-type measure, which we call Pseudo-R2,
that was calculated as the square of the correlation between actual and predicted leverage
ratios and, thus, is comparable across models.7 For the linear model, we report also the
percentage of predictions outside the unit interval. Note that, based on these tables, we
can compare the regression coeﬃcients (and, hence, the marginal eﬀects of covariates) in
terms of their signiﬁcance and sign but not their magnitude, since each model implies a
diﬀerent functional form for E (Y |X), Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0).
Table 5 about here
Table 6 about here
Considering ﬁrst one-part models, note that these new results provide further evidence
about the low ability of the linear model to explain leverage ratios. Indeed, this model
6Alternatively, we could conjecture that most micro ﬁrms with zero debt would really like to have
positive debt but face borrowing constraints, which may be accommodated by a two-part model but not
by a one-part model: under that assumption, we may interpret the ﬁrst level of a two-part model as
explaining the probability of a ﬁrm overcoming possible borrowing constraints. In contrast, we expect
that most of no-debt large ﬁrms do not use debt simply because it is not advantageous for them, which,
as discussed in Section 3, is straightforwardly accommodated by one-part models.
7In a linear regression model, this Pseudo-R2 equals the traditional R2. See Cameron and Trivedi
(2005), section 8.7.1., for a discussion of alternative goodness-of-ﬁt measures for nonlinear models.
19displays the lowest Pseudo-R2 of all models for both groups of ﬁrms. Moreover, if we use
the linear model for predicting leverage ratios for the sampled ﬁrms, in the two regressions
carried out we obtain some predictions outside the unit interval (below zero). As could
be expected, the higher the percentage of zero-debt ﬁrms in each group, the higher the
percentage of negative predicted leverage ratios. In contrast, given that most observed
leverage ratios are very far away from one, ignoring the upper bound of leverage ratios
does not cause any special problem for the tobit model in these examples. Finally, note
that the FRMs display the largest Pseudo-R2’s in all cases. The diﬀerences between the
alternative models are more important for micro ﬁrms, in which case the Pseudo-R2 of
the linear and tobit models are, respectively, about 28% and 14% smaller than that of
the FRM-logit. Interestingly, in spite of treating the zero observations as any other value,
the FRMs seem to ﬁt the data better than the tobit model.
The clear econometric inappropriateness of the linear model does not seem to jeopar-
dize its ability to examine the signiﬁcance of the regression coeﬃcients and to calculate
the type of eﬀect (positive/negative) of the explanatory variables, particularly if we base
our decisions on the 10% signiﬁcance level. Indeed, in such a case, the linear model pro-
duces exactly the same conclusions as FRM-logit in all the regressions performed and
diﬀers from tobit and FRM-loglog only on the analysis of the eﬀects of the variables SIZE
(medium/large ﬁrms) and AGE (micro ﬁrms), respectively. When decisions are based on
the 5% or 1% signiﬁcance levels, the conclusions achieved by each model, although not so
analogous, are still very similar in most cases.
The results produced by the various speciﬁcations considered for two-part models, see
Table 6, are also very similar, both in terms of the signiﬁcance and sign of the parameters
of interest, in all alternative speciﬁcations considered for each component of the 2P-FRM.
Moreover, the Pseudo-R2 displayed by all speciﬁcations in each level of the model is almost
identical in all cases. This similarity of results includes the linear speciﬁcation used in
the second component of some 2P-FRMs. Thus, as had already been suggested by the
tests applied in the previous section, when only leveraged ﬁrms are used in the regression
analysis, the diﬀerences between the various models are attenuated and, hence, linear
models may provide a reasonable approximation for the true data generating process of
leverage ratios. Nevertheless, note that, even in this case, the linear model yields some
negative predicted leverage ratios for both groups of ﬁrms.
20In contrast to the comparisons involving only one class of regression models, we ﬁnd
some important diﬀerences in the comparison of one- and two-part models. As discussed
earlier, while the tobit model assumes that each covariate aﬀects in the same direction
E (Y |X), Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0), the 2P-FRM allows the covariates to aﬀect
in independent ways each one of those quantities. Analyzing Tables 5 and 6, we ﬁnd that,
in fact, tobit and 2P-FRMs often lead to opposite conclusions. For example, according to
the tobit model, the variable SIZE has a positive eﬀect over those three quantities, while
all 2P-FRMs indicate that SIZE inﬂuences positively the probability of a ﬁrm raising debt
but has no (micro ﬁrms) or a negative (medium/large ﬁrms) eﬀect on E (Y |X,Y > 0).8
Also, according to any of the estimated 2P-FRMs, most of the explanatory variables used
in this study are relevant for explaining Pr(Y > 0|X) but not E (Y |X,Y > 0). Note also
that for micro ﬁrms the highest Pseudo-R2’s are displayed by 2P-FRMs (namely, those
based on a logit speciﬁcation for the ﬁrst level of the model), while for medium/large
ﬁrms one-part FRMs present slightly higher values. Both ﬁndings conforms with the
conclusions achieved in the model selection stage described in the previous section.
Overall, the results obtained in this section suggest that if our main interest is simply
the determination of which factors aﬀect capital structure choices, then we should take
a special care in deciding between the use of one- and two-part models. For this option,
the speciﬁcation tests applied in the previous section may be especially useful. Which
particular speciﬁcation should be used in each class of models seems to be a less relevant
issue. However, in some cases, we may also be interested in the magnitude of the eﬀects
that each variable exerts over the proportion of debt used by ﬁrms. As discussed before,
apart from the linear model, the marginal eﬀects yielded by the other models are not con-
stant, depending on the values of the explanatory variables. Thus, in order to investigate
whether the magnitude of marginal eﬀects diﬀers substantially across models, we need to
evaluate them at speciﬁc values of the covariates. This is also the only way of determin-
ing the statistical signiﬁcance and direction of the overall marginal eﬀects produced by
8Note the opposite eﬀects that SIZE has over the two levels of the 2P-FRMs estimated for medium
and large ﬁrms. These eﬀects are in accordance with the two-part capital structure theory put forward
by Kurshev and Strebulaev (2007), see Section 3.1, and accommodate recent ﬁndings by Cassar (2004)
and Faulkender and Petersen (2007), which found that, conditional on having debt, larger ﬁrms are less
prone to use debt.
212P-FRMs.9
In applied work, the two standard measures of marginal eﬀects in nonlinear regression
models are the average sample eﬀect, which is the mean of the partial eﬀects calculated
independently for each ﬁrm in the sample, and the population partial eﬀect, which is
calculated for speciﬁc values of the covariates. In Table 7 we report the latter type of
eﬀect for a ﬁrm belonging to the manufacturing industry (most ﬁrms in our sample are in
this industry) and evaluate each non-binary covariate at its sample mean. We report the
marginal eﬀects of non-binary covariates on E (Y |X), Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0).
Table 7 about here
Regarding the overall marginal eﬀects of covariates, we found that the signiﬁcance
and direction of those eﬀects in 2P-FRMs is similar to those of one-part models. More-
over, the estimates of those eﬀects are of a comparable magnitude across models in most
cases, with a few exceptions occurring mainly in the analysis of the eﬀects of the variable
PROFITABILITY. A similar conclusion can be achieved when we compare the marginal
eﬀects of covariates over the probability of a ﬁrm using debt, especially for the micro ﬁrm
case. In contrast, the estimates produced by the tobit model for the eﬀects of covariates
on E (Y |X,Y > 0) diﬀer substantially from those yielded by 2P-FRMs. In fact, it seems
that in the tobit model the eﬀects on E (Y |X,Y > 0) are confounded by the eﬀects of co-
variates on the participation decision: the former eﬀects are clearly biased in the direction
of the latter, especially for micro ﬁrms. Thus, as already found above for the signiﬁcance
and direction of marginal eﬀects, in terms of their magnitude it is also in the estimation
of eﬀects on E (Y |X,Y > 0) that tobit and 2P-FRMs produce more distinct results.
The similarities and divergences found in this section between the tobit and the 2P-
FRMs may be explained as follows. In the tobit case, the parameters β that appear in
Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0), see expressions (4) and (5), are estimated using both
the censored as well as the uncensored observations. In contrast, with 2P-FRMs the
whole sample is used only in the estimation of the parameters β1P in Pr(Y > 0|X) of
(12), while only the uncensored observations are used to identify the parameters β2P in
E (Y |X,Y > 0) of (13). Hence, while marginal eﬀects for Pr(Y > 0|X), being based on
the same sample, tend to be similar across models, those for E (Y |X,Y > 0), especially
9We use the delta method to test the statistical signiﬁcance of the overall eﬀects of covariates in the
2P-FRMs.
22when the percentage of censored observations is large, as is typical in our and most capital
structure studies, may be very distinct. Therefore, when the mechanisms that explain the
participation and amount debt decisions are diﬀerent, using the tobit model to estimate
eﬀects on E (Y |X,Y > 0) can produce misleading results in terms of signiﬁcance, direction
and magnitude.
4.4 Prediction of leverage ratios
Finally, we may also be interested in using the estimated models for predicting leverage
ratios for speciﬁc ﬁrms. We have already found that, in general, the linear model gives rise
to predicted outcomes outside the unity interval. In this section, we provide a compre-
hensive comparison of the magnitude of predicted outcomes produced by each alternative
regression model.
Table 8 reports the estimated correlations between the leverage ratios predicted by
each model for the sampled ﬁrms in each size-based group. All correlations are high,
being above 0.8 in all cases and 0.9 if we exclude the linear model. Indeed, the lowest
correlations are those that involve the linear model, which is not surprising, since this is
the only model that produces predictions outside the unit interval. Also as expected, the
linear model is less correlated with the other models in the case of micro ﬁrms, suggesting
again that the performance of the linear model eﬀectively deteriorates as the proportion of
zero-debt ﬁrms in the sample increases. Given the results obtained in previous sections, it
was also expected that the correlations between the outcomes predicted by the six variants
of the 2P-FRMs were very high and, in fact, they are at least 0.987 in all cases.
Table 8 about here
A very diﬀerent picture is given by Table 9, where we report the correlations between
the predictions for Pr(Y > 0|X) and E (Y |X,Y > 0) produced explicitly by each 2P-FRM
and implicitly by the tobit model. While the correlations between alternative 2P-FRMs
are again very high in all cases, those involving the tobit model are much lower when the
aim is predicting E (Y |X,Y > 0), which is in accordance with the ﬁndings of the previous
section.
Table 9 about here
23A high correlation between outcomes predicted by diﬀerent models does not automat-
ically imply that the magnitude of those outcomes is similar. Therefore, in Figures 1
and 2 we compare the magnitude of predicted leverage ratios for some speciﬁc cases. We
compute both unconditional (E (Y |X)) and conditional on using debt (E (Y |X,Y > 0))
predictions. In the former case, we consider predictions from all one-part models and two
of the 2P-FRMS included in this empirical study. In the latter case, we consider tobit and
all 2P-FRMs based on diﬀerent speciﬁcations for E (Y |X,Y > 0). In Figure 1, we analyze
the case of a ﬁrm belonging to the manufacturing industry, representing for each model
the corresponding predicted leverage ratio as a function of SIZE. In this representation
we consider for SIZE 1000 equally-spaced values between its 1% and 99% sample quan-
tiles and evaluate the remaining non-binary explanatory variables at their median values.
Figure 2 considers a similar experiment, but in this case the predicted leverage ratios are
calculated as a function of PROFITABILITY. In both ﬁgures, the grey area represents a
95% conﬁdence interval, constructed using the delta method, for the predictions yielded
by the model that produces the most distinct results in each case: the linear model for
E (Y |X) predictions and the tobit model for E (Y |X,Y > 0) predictions.
Figure 1 about here
Figure 2 about here
Figure 1 shows that all models produce very similar predictions for E (Y |X) for most
values of SIZE. Extreme values of SIZE may, however, produce predictions somewhat
diﬀerent across models and originate negative predictions in the linear model. Note also
that only for extreme vales of SIZE the 95% conﬁdence interval for the linear model
does not cover the point predictions of the other models. On the other hand, when the
interest lies on predicting E (Y |X,Y > 0), while the 2P-FRMs yield indistinguishable
predictions, the tobit model gives rise to very distinct results. This is particularly true
for medium and large ﬁrms as a consequence of the opposite signs found for the SIZE
coeﬃcients in the tobit model (see Table 5) and the second-part of the 2P-FRMs (see
Table 6). The analysis of Figure 2 leads to similar conclusions. Thus, overall, we may
conclude that, similarly to the analysis of covariate marginal eﬀects performed in the
previous section, also when making predictions the biggest issue in the modelling of capital
structure choices is deciding whether one- or two-part models should be used, in particular
if those predictions are conditional on ﬁrms using debt. In contrast, choosing the right
24functional form for each type of model seems to be important only if we are interested in
making predictions for extreme values of the covariates.10
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we analyzed the main regression models that may be used to study the
determinants of capital structure choices. We argued that the most commonly used
functional form for modeling leverage ratios, the linear model, is not well suited to data
that is bounded in the unit interval. Instead, (one- or two-part) fractional regression
models seem to be the most natural way of modeling proportional response variables
such as leverage ratios. The censored-at-zero tobit regression model, although do not
taking into account the upper bound of leverage ratios, may be also in many cases a very
reasonable approximation to the data generating process governing leverage ratios. We
discussed the main econometric assumptions and features of the four classes of models
analyzed, provided a theoretical foundation for all models by establishing a link between
them and capital structure theories and reviewed some speciﬁcation tests that may be
applied to select the model (and theory) that provides the best description of ﬁnancial
leverage decisions of particular ﬁrms.
Using a data set previously considered in the literature, we illustrated how the pro-
posed speciﬁcation tests may be used in empirical work and investigated whether or not
using diﬀerent regression models may lead to conclusions substantially diﬀerent. Consid-
ering the case where the only interest is how covariates aﬀect the overall mean proportion
of debt used by ﬁrms (E (Y |X)), we found that the signiﬁcance and the direction of the
marginal eﬀects of covariates is very similar across models. This is a very reassuring result
since, on the one hand, that has been the main aim of most empirical capital structure
studies, and, on the other hand, most of the empirical evidence provided so far is based
on (misspeciﬁed) linear models. In case researchers are also interested in the magnitude
of marginal eﬀects or in the prediction of leverage ratios, then some important diﬀerences
may arise across models, although the estimates produced by the various models are of
comparable magnitude in many cases.
We found also that, given the large number of ﬁrms that typically do not issue debt,
10Note, however, that in such a case it would probably make more sense to use the approach by
Fattouh, Harris and Scaramozzino (2008), based on the use of quantile regressions.
25the most relevant functional form issue in the regression analysis of leverage ratios is
probably the choice between using a one- or a two-part model. In eﬀect, this choice has
two important implications. On the one hand, each one of those classes of model imply
diﬀerent types of capital structure theories. Therefore, rejecting the speciﬁcation of one of
those models imply the rejection of (at least, the standard form of) the corresponding the-
ories. On the other hand, our empirical analysis revealed that, conditional on using debt,
very distinct estimates of leverage ratios and marginal eﬀects (in terms of signiﬁcance,
direction and magnitude) are produced by tobit and two-part models. The speciﬁcation
tests suggested in this paper, in particular the P test based on the full speciﬁcation of
two-part models, proved to be useful to select the best model in each application and
should be routinely applied in empirical studies of capital structure.
While this paper focussed on the study of the determinants of capital structure choices,
there are many other areas of the ﬁnance literature that may also beneﬁt from the use
of the fractional and two-part fractional regression models considered in this paper. Ex-
amples include studying the determinants of cash-holding decisions, corporate dividend
policies, institutional equity ownership and the composition of the board of directors,
where the variable of interest is typically given by, respectively, the ratio of cash and
marketable securities to total assets (Opler, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson, 1999), a
dividend payout ratio (John, Knyazeva and Knyazeva, forthcoming), the ratio of shares
held by institutional investors to total shares outstanding (Gompers and Metrick, 2001)
and the fraction of independent directors on the board (Ferreira, Ferreira and Raposo,
2011). In all these cases, to the best of our knowledge, there is not a single empirical study
that has taken into account the fractional nature of the dependent variable. Moreover,
in some of those examples, there is often a mass-point at zero or one in the distribution
of the variable of interest. For instance, in the case of corporate dividend policies, given
the relatively large number of ﬁrms that often do not pay dividends (Fama and French,
2001), it would be interesting to examine whether the two-part fractional regression model
is more appropriate to explain ﬁrm’s payout ratios than the traditional linear and tobit
models that are still predominant in this area.11
11Actually, as the dividend payout ratio sometimes exceeds the unity for some ﬁrms, in some cases
it may be preferable to use some modiﬁed version of the two-part model. For example, we may use an
exponential regression model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2066) in the second part of the model in order
to guarantee the positiveness of the dependent variable without restricting it to the unit interval. In fact,
26Acknowledgements
The authors thank the referees for valuable comments that helped to improve the paper.
Financial support from Fundacao para a Ciencia e a Tecnologia is gratefully acknowledged
(grant PTDC/ECO/64693/2006).
References
Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. (2002), "Market timing and capital structure", Journal of
Finance, 57(1), 1-32.
Bessler, W., Drobetz, W., Haller, R. and Meier, I. (2011), "Financial constraints and
the international zero-leverage phenomenon", mimeo.
Byoun, S. (2008), "How and when do ﬁrms adjust their capital structures toward tar-
gets?", Journal of Finance, 63(6), 3069-3096.
Byoun, S., Moore, W.T. and Xu, Z. (2008), "Why do some ﬁrms become debt-free?",
mimeo.
Cameron, A.C. and Trivedi, P.K. (2005), Microeconometrics - Methods and Applications,
Cambridge University Press.
Cassar, G. (2004), "The ﬁnancing of business start-ups", Journal of Business Venturing,
19, 261-283.
Cook, D.O., Kieschnick, R. and McCullough, B.D. (2008), "Regression Analysis of Pro-
portions in Finance with Self Selection", Journal of Empirical Finance, 15(5), 860-
867.
Dang, V.A. (2011), "An empirical analysis of zero-leverage ﬁrms: evidence from the
UK", mimeo.
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J.G. (1981), "Several tests for model speciﬁcation in the
presence of alternative hypotheses", Econometrica, 49(3), 781-793.
the same applies to capital structure studies in cases where the ﬁrms with negative book equity are kept
in the analysis and book debt/asset ratios are used as dependent variable.
27Fama, E. and French, K. (2001), "Disappearing dividends: changing ﬁrm characteristics
or lower propensity to pay?", Journal of Financial Economics, 60, 3-43.
Faulkender, M. and Petersen, M.A. (2006), "Does the source of capital aﬀect capital
structure?", Review of Financial Studies, 19(1), 45-79.
Fattouh, B., Harris, L. and Scaramozzino, P. (2008), "Non-linearity in the determinants
of capital structure: evidence from UK ﬁrms", Empirical Economics, 34, 417-438.
Ferreira, D., Ferreira, M. and Raposo, F. (2011), "Board structure and price informa-
tiveness", Journal of Financial Economics, 99(3), 523—545.
Frank, M.Z. and Goyal, V.K. (2008), "Tradeoﬀ and pecking order theories of debt", in
B.E. Eckbo (ed.) Handbook of Corporate Finance - Empirical Corporate Finance,
Vol. 2, Elsevier, pp. 135-202.
Gompers, P. and Metrick, A. (2001), "Institutional investors and equity prices", Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 229-259.
Heckman, J.J. (1979), "Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error", Econometric
Theory, 47(1), 153-161.
Jensen, G., Solberg, D. and Zorn, T. (1992), "Simultaneous determination of insider own-
ership, debt, and dividend policies", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
27(2), 247—263.
Johnson, S.A. (1997), "An empirical analysis of the determinants of corporate debt
ownership structure", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 32(1), 47-69.
John, K., Knyazeva, A., and Knyazeva, D., "Does geography matter? Firm location and
corporate payout policy", Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Kurshev, A. and Strebulaev, I.A. (2007), "Firm size and capital structure", mimeo.
Lemmon, M.L., Roberts, M.R. and Zender, J.F. (2008), "Back to the beginning: per-
sistence and the cross-section of corporate capital structure", Journal of Finance,
63(4), 1575-1608.
28Leung, S.F. and Yu, S. (1996), "On the choice between sample selection and two-part
models", Journal of Econometrics, 72, 197-229.
McDonald, J.F. and Moﬃtt, R.A. (1980), "The uses of tobit analysis", Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 62(2), 318-321.
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. and Williamson, R. (1999), "The determinants and
implications of corporate cash holdings", Journal of Financial Economics, 52(1),
3-46.
Papke, L.E. and Wooldridge, J.M. (1996), "Econometric methods for fractional response
variables with an application to 401(k) plan participation rates", Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 11(6), 619-632.
Prasade, S., Green, C.J. and Murinde, V. (2005), "Company ﬁnancial structure: a survey
and implications for developing economies", in C.J. Green, C.H. Kirkpatrick and V.
Murinde (eds.) Finance and Development: Surveys of Theory, Evidence and Policy,
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 356-429.
Rajan, R.J. and Zingales, L. (1995), "What do we know about capital structure? Some
evidence from international data", Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.
Ramalho, E.A., Ramalho, J.J.S. and Henriques, P. (2010), "Fractional regression models
for second stage DEA eﬃciency analyses", Journal of Productivity Analysis, 34(3),
239-255.
Ramalho, E.A., Ramalho, J.J.S. and Murteira, J. (2011), "Alternative estimating and
testing empirical strategies for fractional regression models", Journal of Economic
Surveys, 25(1), 19-68.
Ramalho, J.J.S. and Silva, J.V. (2009), "A two-part fractional regression model for the
ﬁnancial leverage decisions of micro, small, medium and large ﬁrms", Quantitative
Finance, 9(5), 621-636.
Santos Silva, J.M.C. and Tenreyro, S. (2006), "The log of gravity", Review of Economics
and Statistics, 88(4), 641-658.
Strebulaev, I.A. and Yang, B. (2007), "The mystery of zero-leverage ﬁrms", mimeo.
29Wald, J.K. (1999), "How ﬁrm characteristics aﬀect capital structure: an international
comparison", Journal of Financial Research, 22(2), 161-187.
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002), Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, The
MIT Press.
30Table 1: Summary statistics for leverage ratios
Micro Medium and large ﬁrms
Number of ﬁrms 1446 1295
Number and percentage of
ﬁrms with leverage ratios:
= 0 1282 (88.7%) 634 (49.0%)
> 90% 6 (0.4%) 1 (0.1%)
> 95% 3 (0.2%) 1 (0.1%)




Standard deviation 0.172 0.199
31Table 2: Summary statistics for the explanatory variables
Variable Mean Median Min Max St. Dev.
Micro ﬁrms
NDTS 0.866 0.503 0.000 102.149 4.039
Tangibility 0.355 0.322 0.000 0.998 0.263
Size 12.063 12.080 6.014 17.215 1.173
Proﬁtability 0.075 0.047 -0.486 1.527 0.118
Growth 17.547 6.436 -81.248 681.354 50.472
Age 16.172 12.000 6.000 110.000 10.003
Liquidity 0.296 0.192 0.000 1.000 0.290
Medium and large ﬁrms
NDTS 0.829 0.628 0.000 26.450 1.485
Tangibility 0.461 0.472 0.015 0.979 0.203
Size 15.878 15.699 12.714 22.121 1.152
Proﬁtability 0.054 0.040 -0.134 0.984 0.070
Growth 8.909 5.005 -61.621 188.035 18.284
Age 28.769 24.000 5.000 184.000 24.287
Liquidity 0.120 0.058 0.000 0.963 0.140
32Table 3: Speciﬁcation tests for one-part models (p-values)
Micro ﬁrms Medium and large ﬁrms
Linear Tobit Logit Loglog Linear Tobit Logit Loglog
RESET test 0.000∗∗∗ 0.872 0.586 0.636 0.005∗∗∗ 0.940 0.729 0.843
P test
H1: Linear – 0.024∗∗ 0.452 0.317 – 0.780 0.847 0.527
H1: Tobit 0.000∗∗∗ – 0.979 0.679 0.006∗∗∗ – 0.618 0.863
H1: Logit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.958 – 0.316 0.005∗∗∗ 0.662 – 0.554
H1: Loglog 0.000∗∗∗ 0.871 0.865 – 0.007∗∗∗ 0.676 0.397 –
H1: Logit+Linear 0.000∗∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.843 0.207 0.449
H1: Logit+Logit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.085∗ 0.045∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.596 0.495 0.946
H1: Logit+Loglog 0.000∗∗∗ 0.076∗ 0.042∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.950 0.275 0.606
H1: Loglog+Linear 0.000∗∗∗ 0.173 0.129 0.027∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.623 0.139 0.377
H1: Loglog+Logit 0.000∗∗∗ 0.185 0.135 0.034∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.966 0.289 0.701
H1: Loglog+Loglog 0.000∗∗∗ 0.170 0.127 0.026∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.748 0.171 0.464
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote test statistics which are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively;
heteroskedasticity-robust versions of all test statistics were computed.
33Table 4: Speciﬁcation tests for two-part models (p-values)
Micro ﬁrms Medium and large ﬁrms
Separate assessment of each model level
1st part 2nd part 1st part 2nd part
Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog
RESET test 0.505 0.426 0.741 0.455 0.447 0.837 0.638 0.928 0.774 0.721
P test
H1: Linear – – – 0.248 0.776 – – – 0.557 0.656
H1: Logit – 1.000 0.391 – 0.450 – 0.983 0.924 – 0.860
H1: Loglog 0.305 – 0.554 0.191 – 0.484 – 0.844 0.455 –
Assessment of the model’s full speciﬁcation
Logit+ Logit+ Logit+ Loglog+ Loglog+ Loglog+ Logit+ Logit+ Logit+ Loglog+ Loglog+ Loglog+
Linear Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog
H1: Linear 0.330 0.440 0.239 0.652 0.223 0.734 0.041∗∗ 0.678 0.036∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.823 0.438
H1: Tobit 0.945 0.538 0.300 0.060∗ 0.602 0.838 0.366 0.988 0.861 0.089∗ 0.604 0.461
H1: Logit 0.726 0.925 0.640 0.177 0.023∗∗ 0.474 0.538 0.274 0.668 0.135 0.963 0.633
H1: Loglog 0.788 0.788 0.559 0.242 0.837 0.319 0.878 0.268 0.018∗∗ 0.463 0.181 0.747
H1: Logit+Linear – 0.113 0.070∗ 0.433 0.066 0.216 – 0.020∗∗ 0.475 0.719 0.002∗∗ 0.099∗
H1: Logit+Logit 0.080∗ – 0.299 0.866 0.042∗∗ 0.275 0.602 – 0.514 0.894 0.519 0.408
H1: Logit+Loglog 0.036∗∗ 0.543 – 0.742 0.053∗ 0.236 0.838 0.010∗∗∗ – 0.750 0.056∗ 0.964
H1: Loglog+Linear 0.437 0.416 0.271 – 0.928 0.349 0.056∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.259 – 0.006∗∗∗ 0.157
H1: Loglog+Logit 0.237 0.224 0.178 0.121 – 0.720 0.335 0.028∗∗ 0.896 0.786 – 0.133
H1: Loglog+Loglog 0.146 0.319 0.181 0.418 0.085∗ – 0.097∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.259 0.684 0.003∗∗∗ –
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote coeﬃcients or test statistics which are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively; heteroskedasticity-robust versions of
all test statistics were computed.
34Table 5: Regression results for one-part models
Micro ﬁrms Medium and large ﬁrms
Linear Tobit Logit Loglog Linear Tobit Logit Loglog
NDTS 0.000 -0.073 -0.173 -0.067 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.134∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗
(-0.07) (-1.45) (-1.12) (-1.62) (-2.86) (-2.62) (-2.24) (-2.68)
TANGIBILITY -0.017 0.066 0.037 0.047 0.111∗∗∗ 0.257∗∗∗ 0.925∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗
(-1.05) (0.43) (0.11) (0.38) (3.12) (4.40) (3.20) (3.22)
SIZE 0.028∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.647∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.007 0.028∗∗∗ 0.059 0.026
(6.67) (7.27) (6.67) (6.54) (1.47) (3.42) (1.56) (1.50)
PROFITABILITY -0.069∗∗∗ -1.531∗∗∗ -4.942∗∗∗ -1.612∗∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -1.193∗∗∗ -5.797∗∗∗ -2.421∗∗∗
(-2.71) (-2.76) (-3.23) (-3.61) (-5.84) (-6.37) (-6.59) (-6.57)
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(-0.38) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.19) (3.24) (4.49) (3.99) (3.78)
AGE 0.001∗ 0.007∗∗ 0.014∗ 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.78) (2.07) (1.65) (1.56) (0.05) (0.18) (0.23) (-0.07)
LIQUIDITY -0.039∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗ -1.011∗∗ -0.324∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -1.791∗∗∗ -0.700∗∗∗
(-3.19) (-2.55) (-2.34) (-2.64) (-4.92) (-5.58) (-4.26) (-4.31)
MANUFACTURING -0.031∗∗ -0.265∗∗ -0.485∗ -0.180∗ -0.062∗∗ -0.118∗∗ -0.500∗∗∗ -0.226∗∗
(-1.96) (-2.23) (-1.67) (-1.90) (-2.28) (-2.56) (-2.77) (-2.49)
CONSTRUCTION 0.006 -0.184 0.029 -0.011 -0.032 -0.086 -0.244 -0.124
(0.35) (-1.37) (0.10) (-0.10) (-0.91) (-1.51) (-0.99) (-1.06)
TRADE -0.083∗∗∗ -0.828∗∗∗ -1.822∗∗ -0.465∗ -0.096∗∗ -0.283∗∗∗ -1.028∗ -0.460∗∗
(-3.00) (-3.43) (-2.43) (-1.75) (-2.32) (-2.71) (-1.95) (-2.36)
COMMUNICATION -0.044∗∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -1.407∗∗∗ -0.473∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.103 -0.310 -0.143
(-2.78) (-3.35) (-3.59) (-3.92) (-0.91) (-1.62) (-1.20) (-1.12)
CONSTANT -0.258∗∗∗ -4.010∗∗∗ -10.151∗∗∗ -3.511∗∗∗ 0.085 -0.334∗∗ -2.224∗∗∗ -0.853∗∗∗
(-5.10) (-7.47) (-7.83) (-8.26) (1.06) (-2.33) (-3.40) (-2.83)
Number of observations 1446 1446 1446 1446 1295 1295 1295 1295
Pseudo-R2 0.073 0.087 0.101 0.099 0.079 0.082 0.086 0.086
% of predictions outside
the unit interval 11.1 – – – 1.7 – – –
Notes: below the coeﬃcients we report t-statistics in parentheses; for the RESET test we report p-values; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗
denote coeﬃcients or test statistics which are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively; heteroskedasticity-robust
versions of all test statistics were computed.
35Table 6: Regression results for two-part models
Micro ﬁrms Medium and large ﬁrms
1st part 2nd part 1st part 2nd part
Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog
NDTS -0.181 -0.080 0.027 0.110 0.069 -0.098∗ -0.062∗ -0.014∗ -0.081∗ 0.046∗∗
(-1.39) (-1.49) (0.69) (0.68) (0.59) (-1.87) (-1.94) (-1.91) (1.69) (2.06)
TANGIBILITY 0.266 0.099 -0.054 -0.238 -0.177 1.720∗∗∗ 1.189∗∗∗ -0.003 -0.020 0.000
(0.49) (0.61) (-0.66) (-0.70) (-0.75) (4.86) (4.84) (-0.06) (-0.08) (0.00)
SIZE 0.712∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.013 0.057 0.037 0.275∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.061∗∗∗
(7.85) (7.78) (0.71) (0.72) (0.71) (5.40) (5.44) (-2.97) (-2.91) (-3.02)
PROFITABILITY -3.320∗∗ -1.445∗∗∗ -0.583∗∗ -2.666∗∗ -1.959∗∗ -5.684∗∗∗ -3.629∗∗∗ -0.588∗∗∗ -3.150∗∗∗ -1.812∗∗∗
(-2.35) (-2.61) (-2.15) (-2.12) (-2.55) (-5.27) (-5.42) (-4.21) (-4.01) (-4.41)
GROWTH -0.001 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.010∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.005∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(-0.49) (-0.38) (1.36) (1.38) (1.61) (3.48) (3.50) (1.88) (1.97) (1.93)
AGE 0.020∗∗ 0.009∗∗ -0.002 -0.009 -0.006 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(2.47) (2.15) (-1.12) (-1.12) (-1.29) (0.42) (0.19) (-0.49) (-0.48) (-0.58)
LIQUIDITY -1.141∗∗∗ -0.395∗∗ -0.091 -0.414 -0.242 -2.228∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗ -0.071 -0.375 -0.181
(-2.66) (-2.46) (-1.05) (-1.10) (-1.00) (-5.21) (-5.27) (-1.00) (-1.03) (-0.90)
MANUFACTURING -0.703∗∗ -0.329∗∗ 0.036 0.156 0.081 -0.661∗∗ -0.441∗∗ -0.036 -0.177 -0.102
(-2.44) (-2.49) (0.71) (0.74) (0.60) (-2.27) (-2.00) (-1.01) (-1.07) (-1.06)
CONSTRUCTION -0.656∗∗ -0.319∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ 1.055∗∗∗ 0.751∗∗∗ -0.724∗∗ -0.501∗ 0.039 0.175 0.104
(-2.01) (-2.12) (3.66) (3.64) (3.66) (-2.06) (-1.94) (0.84) (0.80) (0.82)
TRADE -2.447∗∗∗ -0.830∗∗∗ 0.181 0.768 0.535 -1.753∗∗∗ -1.174∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.101 -0.061
(-3.64) (-3.64) (1.26) (1.32) (1.28) (-2.87) (-3.17) (-0.21) (-0.23) (-0.25)
COMMUNICATION -1.230∗∗∗ -0.562∗∗∗ -0.109 -0.491 -0.307∗ -0.859∗∗ -0.588∗∗ 0.034 0.151 0.100
(-3.19) (-3.41) (-1.62) (-1.64) (-1.68) (-2.17) (-2.04) (0.68) (0.66) (0.73)
CONSTANT -9.965∗∗∗ -4.007 0.284 -0.891 -0.181 -3.937∗∗∗ -2.577∗∗∗ 0.703∗∗∗ 1.202∗ 0.949∗∗
(-8.06) (-7.91) (1.14) (-0.84) (-0.26) (-4.51) (-4.05) (5.49) (1.84) (2.69)
Number of observations 1446 1446 164 164 164 1295 1295 661 661 661
Pseudo-R2
- each model level 0.098 0.096 0.293 0.291 0.293 0.109 0.109 0.080 0.080 0.080
- full model (Logit + ...) 0.109 0.108 0.108 0.085 0.084 0.084
- full model (Loglog + ...) 0.104 0.104 0.104 0.083 0.083 0.083
% of predictions outside
the unit interval – – 13.4 – – – – 0.6 – –
Notes: below the coeﬃcients we report t-statistics in parentheses; for the RESET test we report p-values; ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote coeﬃcients or test
statistics which are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively; heteroskedasticity-robust versions of all test statistics were computed.
36Table 7: Marginal eﬀects
Micro ﬁrms Medium and large ﬁrms
Linear Tobit Logit Loglog Logit + Loglog + Linear Tobit Logit Loglog Logit + Loglog +
Logit Loglog Logit Loglog
Marginal eﬀects based on E(Y|X)
NDTS 0.000 -0.006 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.004 -0.009∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.014∗∗∗ -0.014∗
TANGIBILITY -0.017 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.111∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
SIZE 0.028∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.007 0.014∗∗∗ 0.007 0.007 0.007∗ 0.007
PROFITABILITY -0.069∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗ -0.151∗∗∗ -0.181∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗ -0.183∗∗ -0.455∗∗∗ -0.607∗∗∗ -0.653∗∗∗ -0.652∗∗∗ -0.694∗∗∗ -0.665∗∗∗
GROWTH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
AGE 0.001∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.000∗ 0.001 0.001∗∗ 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY -0.039∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗ -0.031∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.168∗∗∗ -0.206∗∗∗ -0.202∗∗∗ -0.188∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗∗ -0.157∗∗
Marginal eﬀects based on Pr(Y>0|X)
NDTS – -0.015 – – -0.013 -0.017 – -0.030∗∗∗ – – -0.024∗ -0.021∗
TANGIBILITY – 0.013 – – 0.020 0.021 – 0.321∗∗∗ – – 0.430∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗
SIZE – 0.056∗∗∗ – – 0.053∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ – 0.036∗∗∗ – – 0.069∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗
PROFITABILITY – -0.308∗∗∗ – – -0.247∗∗ -0.309∗∗∗ – -1.492∗∗∗ – – -1.421∗∗∗ -1.233∗∗∗
GROWTH – 0.000 – – 0.000 0.000 – 0.003∗∗∗ – – 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
AGE – 0.001∗∗ – – 0.001∗∗ 0.002∗∗ – 0.000 – – 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY – -0.083∗∗ – – -0.085∗∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ – -0.507∗∗∗ – – -0.557∗∗∗ -0.458∗∗∗
Marginal eﬀects based on E(Y|X,Y>0)
NDTS – -0.012 – – 0.026 0.025 – -0.009∗∗∗ – – -0.016∗ -0.016∗∗
TANGIBILITY – 0.011 – – -0.056 -0.065 – 0.095∗∗∗ – – -0.004 0.000
SIZE – 0.045∗∗∗ – – 0.013 0.013 – 0.010∗∗∗ – – -0.022∗∗∗ -0.022∗∗∗
PROFITABILITY – -0.246∗∗∗ – – -0.634∗∗ -0.720∗∗ – -0.439∗∗∗ – – -0.618∗∗∗ -0.640∗∗∗
GROWTH – 0.000 – – 0.001 0.001 – 0.001∗∗∗ – – 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
AGE – 0.001∗∗ – – -0.002 -0.002 – 0.000 – – 0.000 0.000
LIQUIDITY – -0.067∗∗ – – -0.099 -0.089 – -0.149∗∗∗ – – -0.074 -0.064
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ denote marginal eﬀects which are signiﬁcant at 1%, 5% or 10%, respectively.
37Table 8: Correlation between predicted leverage ratios - all ﬁrms
Linear Tobit logit loglog logit+linear logit+logit logit+loglog loglog+linear loglog+logit
Micro ﬁrms
Tobit 0.809 –
Logit 0.830 0.965 –
Loglog 0.875 0.957 0.981 –
Logit+Linear 0.846 0.943 0.986 0.984 –
Logit+Logit 0.844 0.944 0.987 0.984 1.000 –
Logit+Loglog 0.844 0.943 0.985 0.983 1.000 1.000 –
Loglog+Linear 0.868 0.919 0.964 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.988 –
Loglog+Logit 0.867 0.920 0.965 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.988 1.000 –
Loglog+Loglog 0.866 0.918 0.963 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.988 1.000 1.000
Medium and large ﬁrms
Tobit 0.938 –
Logit 0.943 0.977 –
Loglog 0.960 0.978 0.995 –
Logit+Linear 0.951 0.959 0.985 0.992 –
Lgit+Logit 0.949 0.959 0.987 0.993 0.999 –
Logit+Loglog 0.949 0.960 0.986 0.993 1.000 0.999 –
Loglog+Linear 0.952 0.949 0.973 0.986 0.997 0.995 0.996 –
Loglog+Logit 0.950 0.950 0.975 0.987 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.999 –
Loglog+Loglog 0.950 0.950 0.974 0.987 0.997 0.996 0.997 1.000 0.999
38Table 9: Correlation between predictions in the two components of two-part models
1st part 2nd part
Logit Loglog Linear Logit Loglog
Micro ﬁrms
Logit – 1.000 –
Loglog 0.986 – 0.998 0.998 –
Tobit 0.989 0.988 0.352 0.351 0.338
Medium and large ﬁrms
Logit – 0.996 –
Loglog 0.995 – 0.998 0.998 –
Tobit 0.963 0.955 0.441 0.444 0.448








































































































































































































Figure 1: Predicted leverage ratios as a function of the SIZE variable
E(Y|X)








































































































































































































Figure 2: Predicted leverage ratios as a function of the PROFITABILITY variable
E(Y|X)
E(Y|X,Y>0)